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1. Introduction 
 
Farming is risky. Farmers live with risk and make decisions every day that affect their farming operations. 
Many of the factors that affect the decisions that farmers make cannot be predicted with 100 percent 
accuracy: weather conditions change; prices at the time of harvest could drop; hired labour may not be 
available at peak times; machinery and equipment could break down when most needed; draught animals 
might die; and government policy can change overnight. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is one of the regions in 
the world most affected by food price volatility and production variability. The continent’s recurrent and 
long history of rainfall fluctuations of varying lengths and intensities along with inadequate infrastructure, 
limited storage facilities and market imperfections are among the major causes for food price and supply 
variability (WB/OECD, 2015).  
 
While all farmers face agricultural risks, poor small-scale farmers in SSA who are less able to access 
resources often exhibit risk averse behaviour. On the one hand, risk-averse farmers might consider 
adopting a water-efficient irrigation technology in order to reduce the production risk they face during 
periods of water shortage (Koundouri et al., 2006). On the other hand, risk-averse farmers may be less 
willing to undertake investments in land and water management technologies that have higher expected 
outcomes, but carry with them risks of failure. For example, it has been found that farm households use 
less fertilizer and are more reluctant to adopt irrigation technologies than they would have used had they 
simply maximized expected profits (Yesuff and Bluffstone, 2007; Muzari et al., 2012; Hill et al. 2013).  
 
Given risk’s potentially central role in farm investment decisions in SSA, better understanding of risk 
behaviour is essential for identifying appropriate farm-level strategies for adaptation to food price 
volatility and production variability by low-income farmers. However, there have been few attempts in 
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the empirical literature to measure the degree of risk aversion of farm households in SSA. Most of these 
have applied experimental approaches to derive farm household risk aversion estimates (Bruntup, 2000; 
Brauw and Eozenou, 2011). To the best of our knowledge, no study has investigated risk aversion attitudes 
of farmers in relation to agricultural water management (AWM) investments in SSA. 
 
The actual and potential positive and significant impacts of investments on AWM technologies on output 
supply and net returns of small-scale farmers in Northern Ghana have been widely recognized 
(Faltermeier and Abdulai, 2009; deGraft-Johnson et al., 2014). Despite evidence from previous studies on 
the effect of risk aversion on farm investment in Ghana (Ayamga et al., 2006; Bendig et al., 2009; Karlan 
et al., 2014), the magnitude and nature of risk aversion of farm households in relation to AWM 
investments remains largely unexplored. To partially close this gap, this paper uses an experimental 
approach applied to 137 households in two communities in Northern Ghana. 
 
This paper’s contribution to the empirical literature on the nature and level of behavioural responses to 
risks in rural areas of Northern Ghana is three-fold. First, we provide evidence on the perceived level of 
risk of land and water management investments from a participatory ranking exercise. Second, using an 
experimental approach with hypothetical payoffs, we estimate risk aversion attitudes of North Ghanaian 
households in relation to investment in land and water management interventions. By incorporating both 
small and large stakes and gains and losses into the experiment, we test for the presence of low stake risk 
aversion and loss aversion. Third, these experimental results are used as data in an econometric model to 
explain those behavioural choices in terms of household, game structure, and site-specific characteristics. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the study setting in Northern 
Ghana and presents key descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents the methodology used for the 
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experimental design and the empirical model. Sections 4 and 5 present and discuss results respectively, 
while section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Description of the Study Site and Household Descriptive Statistics  
 
Primary data collection was conducted in November 2014 in two communities in Northern Ghana, Duko 
and Nyangua, which are part of the intervention sites selected by the Africa Research in Sustainable 
Intensification for the Next Generation (Africa RISING) program. Africa RISING selected 52 communities 
to guarantee an adequate coverage of the spectrum of biophysical and socio-economic conditions 
prevailing in the targeted districts, allowing for a broad assessment of the interventions in areas with 
different agricultural potential (Guo et al., 2013).  The location of these communities is depicted in Figure 
1.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 near here] 
 
A random sample of 137 farm households was chosen to participate in the experiment. We considered 
137 households to be representative of the population in the villages while remaining within the financial 
constraints of the project. The populations of Nyangua and Duko are 2,520 and 1,200 respectively (Ghana 
Statistical Service 2014a, 2014b).  
 
The villages studied are very typical of Northern Ghana and representative of the area as a whole. Both 
communities, as most in this area, are severely affected by drought, low fertility levels of soils and 
insufficient fertilizers, lack of improved varieties and seeds, low prices of produce in the markets, and 
other problems. The whole north of the country (comprised by the Northern, Upper West and Upper East 
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Regions) is characterized by small land holdings of low input– output farming systems with low yields and 
household food and nutritional insecurity. Improved land and water management practices have the 
potential to enhance farmers’ livelihoods in the region. However, farmers have to decide which package 
of options would work best for them and adopt those.  
 
In terms of their representativeness within their districts, Table 1 outlines a number of relevant 
community-level variables (distance to weekly market, population, cultivable land and exposure to 
different type of shocks) and show how Duko and Nyangua compare to the average values at the district 
level (Savelugu-Nanton and Kassena-Nankana East) and to other villages in these districts also selected by 
Africa RISING. As depicted in Table 1, Nyangua and Duko are not systematically different from an average 
village in their districts and do not represent outliers.  
 
[Insert Table 1 near here] 
 
Duko is located in the Savelugu Nanton District, along the Tamale – Bolgatanga Road. The main ethnic 
group of the community is the Dagomba and the main language is the Dagbani. The patrilineal system of 
inheritance is practiced, with land being distributed and sold by the Chief. The community is located in a 
generally flat area with gentle undulating low relief and is drained by the White Volta and its tributary. 
The area receives erratic rainfall at the beginning of the season and experiences an annual rainfall of 
600mm to 1000mm as the season advances, considered enough for a single farming season. The 
vegetation sustains the cultivation of rice, groundnut, yams, cassava, maize, cowpea etc. There are 
dispersed trees of Shea and Dawadawa. Only traditional rainy season farming is practiced in the 
community, with farmers using holing and cutlasses to plough and prepare their land. 
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Nyangua in the Kassena Nankana East District lies within the Guinea Savannah Woodlands. The main 
ethnic group of the community is the Kassena, but there are also Nankan and Bulis settlers and they co-
exist peacefully. The main language of the community is the Kassen. The patrilineal system of inheritance 
is practiced, with land being distributed and sold by the Chief. The community’s climate is characterized 
by the dry and wet seasons which is primarily influenced by North-East Trade Winds (Harmattan air mass) 
and the South-Westerlies (tropical Maritime). During the dry season, rainfall is virtually absent due to the 
low relative humidity, which rarely exceeds 20%, and low vapour pressure of less than 10mb. The 
community is mainly covered by groundwater laterite and interspersed with Savannah Ochrosols. It lies 
on a low lying area and falls within the Tono Dam catchment. Many farmers have dug wells in their farms 
for dry season gardening and there are few dug out areas which are also used for farming and livestock 
watering. The main occupation of the local economy is farming, and the main crops grown include maize, 
rice, millet, groundnut, tomato, onion and pepper. The use of cutlasses and hoes are predominant in their 
farming activities, with few people using animals and tractors to prepare land in their farms. 
 
2.1. Descriptive household statistics 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample households. Almost half of the farmers interviewed 
were female. Most respondents are illiterate and the average number of dependents is about 3.7. Farms 
tend to be small, with a mean of 1.63 hectares and a maximum of almost 11 hectares spread over an 
average of 3.42 plots. Farm plots in these villages tend to be small. In Northern Ghana, land is owned by 
Chiefs and farm households are granted user rights. As a result, there is no land market. This makes land 
a very constrained resource and key to various farming decisions. 
 
[Insert Table 2 near here] 
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A t-test of difference in means indicates that the villages are significantly different in all descriptive 
variables, except for demographic characteristics such as gender, age and number of dependents. Almost 
a quarter of the farmers interviewed in Nyangua were literate, as opposed to less than 5% in Duko. 
Farmers in Nyangua work on more plots of smaller size than those in Duko, probably suggesting a higher 
level of agricultural diversification. Livestock rearing is a key livelihood activity in Nyangua (almost every 
farmer owns one bullock at least), but it seems to hold little importance in Duko. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1. Theoretical framework 
 
There exist two common features to most characterizations of risk. The first is the notion that multiple 
outcomes are possible. In this study, this is given by the amount of rainfall received during the cropping 
season. The second is the notion that the eventual outcome is a matter of chance. For example, before 
making important production decisions, like which land and water management options to invest in, 
farmers do not know how much rain will fall during the cropping season.  
 
Our theoretical framework is founded on the predominant theory in economics for explaining risky 
decisions, which is based on the expected utility hypothesis, first posited by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738 and 
later refined and reintroduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). The expected utility hypothesis 
asserts that a farmer makes choices to maximize expected utility. There are three components to 
expected utility: the possible outcomes, the likelihood of possible outcomes, and the utility of possible 
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outcomes. The likelihood of outcomes is characterized in terms of a probability distribution that is often 
conditioned on a farmer’s choices. Bringing these three components together, in a discrete model, 
expected utility can be defined as 𝐸𝑈(𝑥) = ∑ 𝑝𝑘(𝑥)𝑈(𝑐𝑘)
𝐾
𝑘=1  where 𝑥 reflects a farmer’s choice over 
alternative activities that affect the distribution of outcomes (like the investment on a certain land and 
water management option), 𝐾 is the number of discrete income levels, 𝑐𝑘 is the 𝑘
𝑡ℎ level of income, 𝑈(𝑐𝑘) 
is the utility of outcome 𝑐𝑘 and 𝑝𝑘(𝑥) is the probability of the 𝑘
𝑡ℎ level of income given choice 𝑥. The 
utility derived from a particular outcome serves as a device for capturing farmers’ attitudes toward risk. 
 
A farmer’s risk attitudes can be characterized by the risk premium, which is the difference in the expected 
outcome and the certainty equivalent outcome, 𝑅𝑃(𝑥) = 𝐸𝑐(𝑥) − 𝐶𝐸(𝑥) where 𝐸𝑐(𝑥) is the expected 
outcome and 𝐶𝐸(𝑥) = 𝑈−1(𝐸𝑈(𝑥)) is the certainty equivalent given the inverse utility function 𝑈−1. The 
risk premium measures how much a farmer is willing to give up in order to receive the average outcome 
for certain. Farmers with a positive risk premium are called risk averse. Farmers with no risk premium are 
called risk neutral. Farmers with a negative risk premium are called risk loving or preferring. 
 
Whether a farmer is risk averse, neutral or preferring depends on the shape of their utility function U(c). 
Invariably, c is defined such that the utility function is strictly increasing (the first derivative of the utility 
function is positive: U’(c) > 0), which implies farmers always prefer more to less and a positive marginal 
utility. A farmer is risk averse if the utility function is increasing at a decreasing rate implying the utility 
function is strictly concave and a decreasing marginal utility (the second derivative of the utility function 
is negative: U’’(c) < 0). A farmer is risk neutral if the utility function is increasing at a constant rate implying 
it is linear and a constant marginal utility (U’’(c) = 0). A farmer is risk preferring if the utility function is 
increasing at an increasing rate implying the utility function is convex and an increasing marginal utility 
(U’’(c) > 0). 
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The three most commonly used measures for characterizing risk attitudes are absolute risk aversion 
(𝐴(𝑐) = −
𝑈′′(𝑐)
𝑈′(𝑐)
 ), relative risk aversion (𝑅(𝑐) = −𝑐
𝑈′′(𝑐)
𝑈′(𝑐)
) and partial risk aversion (𝑃(𝑐0, 𝑚) =
−𝑚
𝑈′′(𝑐0+𝑚)
𝑈′(𝑐0+𝑚)
), where m is a monetary gain or loss, c0 is initial income and c (=c0+m) is the final income 
level (Pratt, 1964; Menezes and Hanson, 1970; Zeckhauser and Keeler, 1970; Arrow, 1971). Absolute risk 
aversion traces the behaviour of a farmer toward risk when his/her income rises and the prospect remains 
the same. Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA) implies that a farmer will be more willing to accept 
a risky prospect as income increases. Partial risk aversion examines behaviour when the prospect changes, 
but income remains the same. Increasing Partial Risk Aversion (IPRA) implies a decrease in the willingness 
to take a gamble as the scale of the prospect increases. Relative risk aversion looks at behaviour when 
both the initial income and the level of the prospect rise proportionally. Increasing Relative Risk Aversion 
(IRRA) indicates that a farmer’s willingness to accept a risky prospect declines when both the outcome 
and income increase proportionally. In our study, we explicitly test for IPRA-type behaviour but we cannot 
calculate relative risk aversion nor test for IRRA or DARA, as we do not have a good measure on wealth or 
income. 
 
3.2. Description of the experiment  
 
Farmers were asked to rank the following six land and water management investment options according 
to their perceived level of risk: (i) Hand-dug well and bucket; (ii) Lined well and bucket; (iii) No investment 
at all; (iv) Runoff collection in a pit; (v) Improved fertilizer application; and (vi) Lined well and motorized 
pump. They were told to assume there is a 50 percent probability (same chances) that the following year 
will be a good or bad rainfall year. Then, they were asked to rank the options from 1 to 6, with 1 being the 
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less risky or the safest option (they get the same profits regardless of whether it is a good or a bad rainfall 
year) and 6 being the riskiest option (they get very high profits if it is a good rainfall year but very low if it 
is a bad rainfall year because the investment cost is high). In the next step, these rankings were used to 
derive the profits of each option in a good or a bad year individually for each farmer, according to their 
perception of risk of each alternative. 
 
The Appendix presents the payoffs for the three choice sets offered to respondents. Though the amounts 
may seem low, it must be recalled that incomes in the study area are very low1, so the amounts listed 
indeed provide significant incentive for respondents to carefully consider the options and reveal their true 
preferences. Alternative choices to invest in land and water management options reveal farmers’ risk 
preferences for both small and large stake outcomes and gains and losses. To examine the nature of partial 
risk aversion for each farm household, we increase the outcome of the first choice set by factors of 10 and 
20. These are represented as Sets 2 and 3 in the Appendix. To test for significant differences in behaviour 
when faced with the possibility of losses as opposed to gains-only, choice sets involving losses to farm 
households were incorporated into the experiment. This tells us something about whether farm 
households are more responsive to the possibility of agricultural losses than gains.  
 
We follow the experimental design developed by Binswanger (1980) to reveal risk preferences and frame 
the choices to reflect real life farming decisions. Although the Holt and Laury (2002) approach is the most 
                                                          
1 The concentration of poor persons is mainly observed in the northern than the southern districts of Ghana. Considering a 
poverty line of GHC 1,314 per year, the poverty head count (% of people below the poverty line) in Savelugu-Nanton is 32.3 and 
in Kassena-Nankana East is 24.2. These figures are significantly higher to regional averages in the south of Ghana (6.6 in Accra 
Region, 13.6 in Ashanti Region, 19.2 in Western Region, 19.6 in Central Region and 22 in Eastern Region), but they are lower than 
regional averages in the North of Ghana (44.2 in Northern Region, 45.9 in Upper East Region and 69.4 in Upper West Region), 
due to the prevalence of pockets of deep poverty in these regions (Ghana Statistical Service 2015). 
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commonly used approach to elicit risk preferences through field experiments (in developed country 
settings) since it allows for consistency checks and within-subject stochastic error, we decided the best 
option for the characteristics of our choice set was the Binswanger (1980) approach. Holt and Laury (2002) 
elicit decisions between only two options and vary the probability of the high and low payoffs through 10 
hypothetical scenarios.  However, in our study farmers are allowed to choose among six land and water 
management options, not two. Thus, instead of estimating the risk aversion class by the cross over point 
from a less risky to a more risky lottery, we estimated it based on a one-time choice among six lotteries 
and one probability function.  
 
The basic structure of the experiment using Set 1 as an example is given in Table 3. After individually 
ranking the dry season land and water management options from least to riskiest, the farmers were shown 
the good and the bad outcomes of each of the six different options depending on a 50 percent probability 
of a good or bad rainfall year. For each alternative, the expected gain and spread increased. Respondents 
were asked to choose one of the options. It is typically useful to compute a risk aversion coefficient that 
can serve as a measure of household level of risk aversion. For this purpose we employ a Constant Partial 
Risk Aversion (CPRA) utility function of the form U = (1−γ )CE(1−γ ) , where γ is the coefficient of risk 
aversion, and CE is the certainty equivalent of a prospect. The upper and lower limits of the CPRA 
coefficients for each prospect of our experiment are given in Table 3.  
 
[Insert Table 3 near here] 
 
3.3. Empirical model 
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The experimental results were used as data in an econometric model to examine the determinants of risk. 
Our experimental data has the feature that it is ordinal in nature, ranging from 1 (extreme risk aversion) 
to 6 (risk loving behaviour). With such ordinal data, an ordered probit model is most appropriate. This 
approach has the advantage that we need not assume a particular form of the utility function and instead 
use the underlying latent variable to model the risk averting behaviour of farm households. The ordered 
probit model impose what is called the proportional odds assumption on the data, also known as the 
parallel lines or parallel regressions assumption. We tested the validity of this assumption, using the 
gologit2 command in STATA, and found that all variables, except for farm size and the village dummy, 
violate the parallel lines assumption. While the generalized ordered logit model provides an alternative 
model in which some variables are constrained to meet the parallel lines assumption while others are not 
(making it more parsimonious and interpretable than non-ordinal methods, such as multinomial logistic 
regression), it is very sensitive to low frequency counts (e.g., small cell sizes). Thus, it is often necessary to 
combine the dependent variable categories that have low frequencies with adjacent categories in order 
for the estimation procedure to work. However, combining categories may also lead to a loss in 
information, especially if the underlying latent variable is multi-levelled or continuous. As a result, we 
have chosen to present the results from the ordered probit model. A larger sample size and fewer 
explanatory variables would have made the use of generalized models more feasible. 
 
Assume there is a latent variable 𝑦𝑖
∗ measuring the degree of risk aversion of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ decision maker as 
described in equation (1). 
 
𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖                                                                                                                                             (1) 
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for a kx1 parameter vector β, stochastic disturbance term 𝑢𝑖, and a vector of regressors 𝑥. We assume 
the disturbance term has a standard normal distribution yielding the ordered probit model. The six 
outcomes for the observed variable 𝑦𝑖  are assumed to be related to the latent variable through the 
observability criterion in equation (2), for a set of threshold parameters α0 to α6, where α0<α1<α2<
α3<α4<α5<α6, α0= -∞ and α6=∞. 
 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑚    𝑖𝑓    𝛼𝑚−1 ≤ 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝛼𝑚    𝑓𝑜𝑟   𝑚 = 1, … ,6                                                                                      (2) 
 
Several characteristics of the game are included as regressors. First, to formally test the IPRA hypothesis 
we include the expected value of each game level as a scale variable. Second, in order to test differences 
in behaviour between gains-only games and games involving losses, we include dummy variables for 
games involving real losses. As discussed earlier, this is one way of formally testing for loss aversion. If we 
find this coefficient to be statistically significant, then we can conclude that decision makers treat 
opportunity losses differently from real losses. 
 
We include several characteristics of the respondent, including age, gender, and literacy, without any a 
priori expectations of the signs. As part of household characteristics, we also include number of 
dependents in our model and expect a positive relationship with risk aversion. Farm size and number of 
plots are included to capture wealth. Although the literature on technology adoption suggests that 
wealthier households can better insulate themselves from shocks and will thus be less risk averse, for a 
farmer who lives near the poverty threshold, the lower his wealth is, the less risk averse he becomes as 
well. Thus, we do not have any a priori expectation on the sign of this coefficient. Finally, we include a site 
dummy in the model for all sites. 
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4. Results  
 
4.1. Perceived risk of water management options 
 
We start our analysis by exploring the responses of participants to rank the relative riskiness of the six 
land and water management investment options. Table 4 presents the distribution of farmers’ 
perceptions for the least and most risky investment options. 
 
[Insert Table 4 near here] 
 
Improved fertilizer is perceived as the least risky option, particularly in Duko (Northern Region) where 
most farmers do not have any experience on dry season irrigation. In most cases, no investment in any 
land or water management option was considered as the riskiest option, which indicates that the majority 
of farmers understand the effect of rainfall variability on their profits and are willing to invest on their 
farms to buffer this risk. The most cited reasons for their rankings were as follows (in no particular order): 
1. Capital: availability of financial resources to invest. 
2. Size of farm: farmers with larger farms tend to choose lined well and pump as a safer option. 
3. Labour: availability of on-farm labour for the most demanding investment options. 
4. Age: older farmers tend to choose less labour-demanding options. 
5. Location: farms far from water sources tend to choose improved fertilizer as least risky.  
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6. Nature of land: farmers who own flat lands tend to choose fertilizer as least risky because it does not 
wash off easily when it rains, while farmers on sloppy areas tend to choose investing in pumps to 
reduce their movements. 
7. Previous knowledge on farming: more experienced farmers tend to choose fertilizer as the least risky 
option because they have witnessed the significant loss of nutrients in their lands over the years. 
 
4.2. Risk aversion attitudes  
 
We start our analysis of risk aversion attitudes by exploring the responses of participants to each set of 
the experiment. Table 5 presents the distribution of risk averting behaviour for each level of the 
experiment. In gains-only games, a majority of the farm households exhibit extreme risk aversion.  
 
[Insert Table 5 near here] 
 
Our results on the distribution of risk averting behaviour for each level of the experiment are inconclusive 
with regards to whether farmers become more or less risk averse as the size of the stakes increases. Two 
findings would indicate that farmers become less risk averse: (i) the proportion of households that chose 
the alternative representing extreme risk aversion decreases as stakes increase, and (ii) the proportion of 
households that chose the alternatives representing neutral or risk loving increases as stakes increase. 
However, as the proportion of households that chose the alternatives representing the rest of the risk 
categories does not follow a clear trend when stakes are increased, we do not have sufficient evidence 
yet to claim whether farmers become more or less risk averse with the size of the stakes.  
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A comparison of choices between games involving only gains and gains and losses shows a surprising 
inclination of farm households to be less risk averse when there are losses. The results of the gamma and 
taub tests are summarized in Table 6. The null hypothesis that the subjects’ risk preferences are equivalent 
in both kinds of games is rejected for each portion of the experiment.  
 
[Insert Table 6 near here] 
 
Table 7 presents median levels of risk aversion for each level of the game along with the CPRA coefficients 
corresponding to each risk category. Farmers in Duko seem to be slightly less risk averse than their 
counterparts in Nyangua. We see that farmers in the whole sample are more risk averse (intermediate 
median risk aversion) at the lowest level of the game than at the highest level (moderate median risk 
aversion) in the gains-only games. The trend in the gains-and-losses game is fairly constant at moderate 
risk aversion for all stakes. These findings suggest that even when both gains and losses are possible and 
the probability of each outcome is the same, increasing the stakes does not cause households to become 
more risk averse. Variance reduction may not be the most important outcome for low income farmers 
who live near the poverty threshold, and thus place little value on reducing risk by itself. This result 
indicates that optimal risk behaviour in the face of income thresholds may not be adequately captured by 
a mean-variance utility maximization framework, and a poverty trap avoidance utility function may be 
more appropriate (Osgood and Shirley, 2010). 
 
[Insert Table 7 near here] 
 
Given the current situation in Northern Ghana, we argue that one reason farmers do not always seek to 
minimize variance is that they may be very near a poverty trap threshold, and are therefore less willing to 
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give up additional expected income in exchange for decreased income variance. The implication for 
insurance programs is that it may be best for implementers to utilize insurance to unlock increases in 
productivity as opposed to variance reduction per se. As productivity increases depend on crop specific 
gaps, these programs can also maximize their impact on poverty reduction by other measures, such as 
promoting crop diversification and investments in equipment to farm during the dry season and to reduce 
post-harvest losses.  
 
4.3. Econometric Analysis of Risk Averting Behaviour 
 
The results of the ordered probit model are given in Table 8, where the dependent variable is the 
respondent’s risk aversion category (1 to 6) for each game played. The sample size is therefore greater 
than 137, because all respondents played more than one game. 
 
[Insert Table 8 near here] 
 
Because extreme risk aversion takes the value one and risk-loving is indicated by a value of six, a positive 
coefficient sign indicates a negative relationship with risk aversion. Of all the wealth indicators only the 
number of plots in Duko is significant but negative at the 10 percent level, indicating that more wealth is 
not correlated with a lower or higher degree of risk aversion. Particularly if a farmer owns plots far away 
from each other, the investment on dry season irrigation may be much higher than if the whole farm area 
is in the same plot (for example if he/she is investing in lined wells, he/she will have to dig and line more 
than one well and transport the pump from one plot to another or use several pumps). 
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All parameter estimates for the variables indicating the game characteristics are significant and formally 
confirm the basic results presented in Tables 5 and 7. First, as indicated by a statistically significant loss-
game dummy variable, people are less risk averse in games involving losses than in gains-only games. 
Second, there is a negative relationship between the expected payoff variable and the degree of risk 
aversion, implying that people are likely to take more risk when high gains are at stake. This result rejects 
the IPRA hypothesis and suggests that under the current circumstances in Northern Ghana most farmers’ 
current wealth put them at risk of falling into a poverty trap so that they are not variance minimizers, but 
rather are looking for a way to maximize productivity in a way that does not require them to sacrifice a 
lot of their expected income. 
 
A number of respondent characteristics are also significantly related to risk aversion. Age is negatively 
correlated with the degree of risk aversion, indicating that people become less risk averse as they age. 
This is probably because they have more assets or a wider social network to fall back on if they do not 
recover their investment due to a bad rainfall year.  Although males are the major decision makers in most 
households in Ghana, in our model, male respondents are not found to be less risk averse than females. 
Literacy is negatively correlated with risk aversion only in Duko, literate farmers may be more productive 
or have other sources of income not captured in the model, which makes them less risk averse.  
 
Significant site dummies indicate systematic, but unobservable differences in risk aversion across study 
sites besides their dry season irrigation practices. Duko farmers are less risk averse than those at Nyangua 
and one reason for this difference may be because they are poorer. In this case, the goal of most farmers 
is to avoid falling into a poverty trap, so then the lower their income is, the less risk averse they becomes 
in the mean-variance utility maximization framework. While farmers in both communities are less risk 
averse in games involving losses than in gains-only games, in Nyangua the difference in risk attitudes 
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between both types of games is larger. An increase in stakes reduces risk aversion equally in Nyangua and 
Duko (farmers become less risk averse). 
 
5. Discussion 
 
This section situates the key findings of this study within the wider literature of experimental elicitation 
of risk aversion in SSA and suggests opportunities for future improvements. Risk aversion attitudes in our 
sample are somehow in contrast with those found by other studies in SSA, as implied by the risk aversion 
distributions corresponding to different game levels. Around 60% of farmers were risk-averse in the gains-
only games, compared to 79 to 98% found by Yesuff and Bluffstone (2007) in Ethiopia. In addition, as the 
game level rose, the distribution shifted to the right, i.e., farmers became less risk averse, contrary to 
results of studies in Zambia (Wik et al. 2004) and Ethiopia (Yesuff and Bluffstone, 2007). Selected results 
of the regression analysis relating risk aversion to demographic and socioeconomic factors mirror those 
of previous studies in SSA, such as higher literacy leading to less risk averse farmers (Wik et al., 2004; 
Liebenehm and Waibel, 2012). However, while the number of bullocks has been found to lead to less risk 
averse farmers in Ethiopia, Mali and Burkina Faso (Yesuff and Bluffstone, 2007; Liebenehm and Waibel, 
2012), we found no significant effect of this variable, just as gender and the number of dependents, on 
which previous literature is inconclusive. 
 
Risk attitudes and discount rates are not merely a reflection of personal preferences but represent 
economic and other conditions of the individuals and households. Despite the potentially important 
insight to be gained from analysing the regional variation in risk and time preferences, most experimental 
studies have lacked such analyses due to limited sample sizes and geographical variation. In our study, we 
compared two communities in different regions of the North of Ghana and discovered systematic 
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differences in risk aversion across them. A number of reasons, based on the results of a few studies in 
SSA, may explain this difference: 
 Hysteresis (path dependence) in risk preference formation. Households in Nyangua may have 
experienced more shocks than those in Duko, being the area drier and more vulnerable to 
drought. This past failure may make them less likely to choose more risky propositions. Similarly 
to findings in Ethiopia by Yesuff and Bluffstone (2007), even in very poor regions success can build 
on success, with people being more willing to accept risk if the past has gone well.  
 Distance to nearest local market. Lower levels of risk aversion in Duko may be partly explained by 
a shorter distance to the local market and to the major urban centre of Tamale, capital of the 
Northern Region. This is intuitive in the sense that we would expect people in villages that are 
closer to local markets to have more access to information, resulting in more risk-neutral 
preferences. 
 Local environment. Risk preferences may differ significantly across agricultural climatic zones, 
proving that participants in the experiment were affected by regional factors and background risks 
posed by the local environment, as found by Tanaka and Munro (2014) in Uganda. Farmers in the 
agro-climatically least favourable zone that receives less rainfall on average and is more prone to 
drought (Nyangua) are the most risk averse.  
 Cultural factors. In a similar study in Tanzania, Henrich and McElreath (2002) found that culture 
was the only factor that was consistently related to the observed variation in risk aversion. 
Cultural heuristics may be an important driver of risk attitudes in our sample as the farmers in 
Duko and Nyangua belong to different ethnic groups. 
 
The present study could be improved by exploring the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the 
Binswanger (1980) over the Holt and Laury (2002) approach. However, this test would entail increasing 
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the number of choice series each participant would have to face, as he or she would now have to compare 
five pairs separately (choose between management option 1 and option 2, option 2 and 3, etc.), instead 
of all six options at once. An additional refinement of the present study would be test the relevance of 
Prospective Theory (PT) versus EUT to predict poor farmers’ behaviour. The Tanaka et al. (2010) approach, 
which has recently gained popularity in developing countries, uses three choice sets between pairs to 
elicit three PT parameters. This approach would allow us to consider both subjective probability weighting 
and loss aversion in addition to the curvature of the utility function, thus differentiating among different 
sources of risk aversion (Holden and Quiggin, 2016). 
 
Finally, the results of the present study could also be enhanced by a comparison of risk aversion attitudes 
at the individual vs. household level. Experimental elicitation techniques are based on individual answers 
to hypothetical questions regarding risk alternatives or risky games. Studies in developing country settings 
that have computed risk aversion at the household level, selected households and later used the 
responses of one person in the household (usually household heads). The individual responses of this 
participant are then presented as household level risk aversion, but they are actually the results of one 
individual’s attitudes. In our study, we selected one individual of each household but preferred to present 
the results as individual risk aversion attitudes as investments on water and land management are usually 
done at the individual level. This also allowed us to explore the effect of individual factors (such as gender 
or age) on risk aversion. Future studies are needed to develop approaches to assess household level risk 
aversion, as this analysis may yield very relevant results in terms of intra-household heterogeneity in risk 
aversion attitudes and its implications on income distribution, empowerment and livelihoods by gender 
and age. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
Despite risk’s potentially central role in farm investment decisions, there have been few attempts to 
estimate the magnitude and nature of risk aversion of farm households in Sub-Saharan Africa. This study 
is one attempt to reveal farmers’ risk preferences in relation to agricultural water management 
investments. Using household data from Northern Ghana we find that the use of improved fertilizer is 
usually perceived as the least risky option, especially in areas where most farmers have little or no 
experience on dry season irrigation. The option of not investing in any land or water management option 
was considered as the riskiest option by the majority of farmers, indicating an understanding of the effect 
of rainfall variability on farm profits. 
 
Contrary to what is usually perceived, only 30 percent of the households fell into the severe to extreme 
risk aversion categories. This contrasts with other studies in SSA, where most household decision-makers 
exhibit severe to extreme risk aversion. In regards to the determinants of risk averting behaviour, we find 
that age and literacy have a statistically and statistically significant effect in decreasing risk aversion. We 
also find that households that stand to lose as well as gain something from participation in games are 
statistically significantly less risk averse than households playing gains-only games. This result suggests 
that, under the current circumstances in Northern Ghana, most farmers’ current wealth put them at risk 
of falling into a poverty trap. Thus, farmers in the area are not variance minimizers, but rather looking for 
a way to maximize productivity in a way that does not require them to sacrifice a lot of their expected 
income. 
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The finding that even with the possibility of losses households are less risk averse when stakes are higher, 
suggests again that farmers close to poverty traps are willing to take on larger gambles. The immediate 
welfare implications of these findings are obvious: in a region characterized by poverty trap dynamics, 
poor farmers are more likely to take seemingly excessive risks and fall into a poverty trap. From a policy 
perspective, evidence that the losses from the riskiest investments on AWM technologies may fall more 
heavily on the poor suggests that additional efforts be given to the creation of viable insurance 
mechanisms. While there are a few pilot projects attempting to implement these ideas, it remains to be 
seen if insurance mechanisms coupled with loans for AWM investments can be successfully employed to 
diminish the forces that contribute to the intergenerational transmission of poverty. 
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Appendix: Risk Games Used in the Experiment  
Set 1: Low range of payoffs 
 
Gains-only game 
Investment option Profits (GHC) Risk aversion class 
 Bad rainfall Good rainfall  
1 5 5 Extreme 
2 4.5 9 Severe 
3 4 12 Intermediate 
4 3 15 Moderate 
5 1 19 Slight to neutral 
6 0 20 Neutral to preferring 
Notes: 1USD=3.2GHC 
 
Gains and losses game 
Investment option Profits (GHC) Risk aversion class 
 Bad rainfall Good rainfall  
1 0 0 Extreme 
2 -0.5 4 Severe 
3 -1 7 Intermediate 
4 -2 10 Moderate 
5 -4 14 Slight to neutral 
6 -5 15 Neutral to preferring 
Notes: 1USD=3.2GHC 
 
Set 2: Medium range of payoffs 
 
Gains-only game 
Investment option Profits (GHC) Risk aversion class 
 Bad rainfall Good rainfall  
1 50 50 Extreme 
2 45 90 Severe 
3 40 120 Intermediate 
4 30 150 Moderate 
5 10 190 Slight to neutral 
6 0 200 Neutral to preferring 
Notes: 1USD=3.2GHC 
 
Gains and losses game 
Investment option Profits (GHC) Risk aversion class 
 Bad rainfall Good rainfall  
1 0 0 Extreme 
2 -5 40 Severe 
3 -10 70 Intermediate 
4 -20 100 Moderate 
5 -40 140 Slight to neutral 
6 -50 150 Neutral to preferring 
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Notes: 1USD=3.2GHC 
 
 
Set 3: Large range of payoffs 
Gains-only game 
Investment option Profits (GHC) Risk aversion class 
 Bad rainfall Good rainfall  
1 100 100 Extreme 
2 90 180 Severe 
3 80 240 Intermediate 
4 60 300 Moderate 
5 20 380 Slight to neutral 
6 0 400 Neutral to preferring 
Notes: 1USD=3.2GHC 
 
Gains and losses game 
Investment option Profits (GHC) Risk aversion class 
 Bad rainfall Good rainfall  
1 0 0 Extreme 
2 -10 80 Severe 
3 -20 140 Intermediate 
4 -40 200 Moderate 
5 -80 280 Slight to neutral 
6 -100 300 Neutral to preferring 
Notes: 1USD=3.2GHC 
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Figure 1: Map of the two communities surveyed in Northern Ghana 
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Table 1. Biophysical and socioeconomic characteristics of Nyangua and Duko with respect to other 
villages in the same district and district averages. 
Africa 
Rising 
communi
ties 
Distance 
to weekly 
market 
(min) 
Cultivable 
land: % of 
total land 
Popula
tion 
total 
% households affected by shocks 
 
    Drought Crop 
disease 
/pest 
Livestock 
disease 
Large 
rise in 
input 
prices 
Large fall 
in crop 
sale 
prices 
Savelugu-Nanton District 
Botingli 35 80 1600 100 100 0 0 0 
Disiga 30 60 1500 100 100 100 100 0 
Duko  15 46 1300 100 100 100 100 0 
Gushie 30 95 1135 0 100 75 0 100 
Jana 30 0 2000 100 100 100 100 0 
Kadia 45 60 No inf. 100 100 100 100 100 
Kpallung 105 50 1800 100 100 100 100 100 
Kpelung 60 70 700 100 100 100 0 25 
Kukobila 40 34 1016 100 100 100 100 100 
Nabogu 15 70 3450  100 100 100 100 100 
Pigu 120 60 3200 100 100 100 100 100 
Tibali 20 50 2400 100 100 100 100 0 
Tindan 45 70 1235 100 100 100 100 0 
Average 45 57 1778 92 100 90 77 48 
 
Kassena Nankana East District 
Bonia 30 80 6000 100 30 50 80 80 
Gia 60 80 600 100 20 40 0 40 
Nyangua  60 60 2520 70 40 20 0 0 
Tekuru 90 80 2500 70 20 60 80 0 
Average 60 75 2905 85 27 42 40 30 
 
Source: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 2015. "Ghana Africa Research in Sustainable 
Intensification for the Next Generation (Africa RISING) Baseline Evaluation Survey", doi:10.7910/DVN/QUB9UT. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics (n=137) 
Variable Mean (Standard deviation)    Difference in means 
(Standard error)  Nyangua Duko 
Gender 
(1=female) 
0.49 0.43 0.06* (0.09) 
Age 36.41 40.10 -3.69* (1.96) 
Literacy (1=if yes) 0.24 0.04 0.20 (0.06) 
Number of 
dependents 
3.71 3.70 0.01* (0.33) 
Number of plots 4.64 2.61 1.63 (0.35) 
Farm size 
(hectares) 
1.06 2.19 -1.13 (0.23) 
Number of 
bullocks 
0.82 0 0.82 (0.14) 
 
Notes: * denotes a difference in means that is NOT significant with 95% confidence. 
 
Table 3. The basic structure of the experiment 
Investment 
options 
Bad rainfall 
profits 
Good 
rainfall 
profits 
Expected 
gain 
Standard 
deviation 
CPRA 
Coefficient 
Risk 
classification 
1 5 5 5 0 ∞ to 7.47 Extreme 
2 4.5 9 6.75 3.18 7.47 to 2.00 Severe 
3 4 12 8 5.65 2.00 to 0.85 Intermediate 
4 3 15 9 8.49 0.85 to 0.32 Moderate 
5 1 19 10 12.73 0.32 to 0 Slight to 
neutral 
6 0 20 10 14.14 0 to -∞ Neutral to 
preferring 
 
Table 4. Distribution of perceptions on riskiness of land and water management investments (%) 
Investment options Perceived as least risky Perceived as riskiest 
Hand dug well + bucket 19.71 4.38 
Lined well + bucket 12.41 0 
No investment at all 8.03 91.24 
Runoff collection pit 8.03 0 
Improved fertilizer 34.31 0 
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Lined well + pump 25.55 0 
 
Table 5. Distribution of risk averting behavior by set (%) 
Risk 
category 
Gains-only games Gains-and-loses games 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Extreme 28.47 27.01 21.90 10.95 8.76 9.49 
Severe 10.22 10.22 10.95 18.25 10.95 14.60 
Intermediate 11.68 17.52 12.41 19.71 19.71 21.17 
Moderate 10.22 8.76 18.98 19.71 27.01 17.52 
Slight to 
neutral 
13.87 14.60 15.33 10.22 16.06 17.52 
Neutral to 
preferring 
25.55 21.90 20.44 21.17 17.52 19.71 
 
 
Table 6. Gamma and taub tests for equivalence of risk preferences for gains-only and gains-and-loss 
games. 
Hypothesis Statistics (p-values) 
 Gamma Taub 
Gain-only game in experiment 1 is equivalent to 
loss game in experiment 1 
0.2054 (0.09) 0.1693 (0.075) 
Gain-only game in experiment 2 is equivalent to 
loss game in experiment 2 
0.1941 (0.093) 0.1596 (0.077) 
Gain-only game in experiment 3 is equivalent to 
loss game in experiment 3 
0.1837 (0.092) 0.1530 (0.077) 
Notes: Gamma and taub are measures of association between two ordinal variables (both have to be in the same 
direction, i.e. negative to positive, low to high). Both go from -1 to 1. Negative shows inverse relationship, closer 
to 1 a strong relationship. Gamma is recommended when there are lots of ties in the data. Taub is recommended 
for square tables. 
 
Table 7. Median levels of risk aversion. 
Experiment 
sets 
Gains-only games Gains-and-losses games 
Duko Nyangua All Duko Nyangua All 
1 4 3 3 4 3.5 4 
2 3 3 3 4 4 4 
3 4 3 4 4 4 4 
1=Extreme (γ=∞ to 7.47), 2= Severe (γ=2.00 to 7.47), 3=intermediate (γ=0.85 to 2.00), 4=moderate (γ=0.32 to 0.85), 
5=slight to neutral (γ=0 to0.32), 6=neutral to loving(0 to - ∞) 
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Table 8. Ordered probit models of risk aversion 
Variable Parameter estimates 
Duko Nyangua All sites 
Gender 0.175 (0.140) 0.030 (0.109) 0.0854 (0.0826) 
Age 0.008* (0.004) 0.017*** (0.006) 0.011*** (0.003) 
Literacy 0.755*** (0.276) -0.110 (0.129) 0.001 (0.111) 
Number of dependents 0.043 (0.033) -0.048 (0.031) 0.015 (0.021) 
Number of plots -0.093* (0.049) 0.005 (0.026) -0.028 (0.020) 
Farm size -0.009 (0.015) 0.073 (0.046) -0.017 (0.013) 
Number of bullocks Omitted because of 
collinearity 
0.015 (0.046) 0.021 (0.045) 
Site dummy (=1 for 
Duko) 
  0.193* (0.099) 
Dummy for loss games 
(=1 for a loss game) 
0.494*** (0.117) 0.566*** (0.116) 0.526*** (0.082) 
Expected payoff 0.007*** (0.001) 0.007 ***(0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) 
Cut 1 -0.053 (0.295) 0.299 (0.276) 0.122 (0.188) 
Cut 2 0.350 (0.298) 0.828 (0.279) 0.581 (0.190) 
Cut 3 0.807 (0.299) 1.383 (0.281) 1.079 (0.192) 
Cut 4 1.211 (0.300) 1.947 (0.285) 1.549 (0.194) 
Cut 5 1.597 (0.301) 2.545 (0.290) 2.013 (0.196) 
Log likelihood function -681.434 -692.274 -1398.150 
Wald Chi-squared  76.93 69.91 128.48 
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.048 0.043 
Number of 
observations 
414 408 822 
Dependent variable: degrees of risk aversion (1=extreme…….6=neutral to risk loving) 
Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. 
***, **, * indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
